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The Spatial Distribution of Geoprivacy Concerns in Florida:
A County Level Analysis
Joshua W. House
ABSTRACT
Certain types of spatial data maintained and distributed by counties at
taxpayer expense can be used with powerful mapping and analysis software,
called Geographic Information Systems (GIS), to compromise an indvidual’s
locational privacy. The kind of privacy at threat here is referred to as geoprivacy,
which is concerned with the rights to prevent disclosure of the location of one's
home, workplace, or daily activities. While the availability of accessible and
accurate geospatial data has increased geoprivacy concerns in recent years, this
threat remains virtually unknown to the general public.
Although previous research has explored various components of the
geoprivacy debate, the fragmented and localized nature of this work does not
adequately address the threat on a large scale or lend itself for use in multi-level
policy discussions. This thesis fills the need for a comprehensive and systematic
geoprivacy study by examining county data availability in the entire state of
Florida.
Ultimately, the success of geoprivacy violation attempts is determined by
the availability and quality of the data being used. In order to evaluate this threat,
iv

a statewide inventory of the data necessary for a reverse geocoding
operation, defined here as geoprivacy data elements, was created. A specific
county (Bay County) with complete data availability was then selected and its
geoprivacy data elements, specifically street, parcel, and address point layers
were evaluated for their reverse geocoding and subsequent identity disclosure
success. These findings were then compared with the results of the statewide
inventory to determine the level of exposure that the state’s residents are
subjected to, based on their county’s data offerings.
The statewide data inventory indicated substantial variation in county
availability, quality, and delivery methods of the desired geoprivacy data
elements. The results of the reverse geocoding operation performed with Bay
County’s geoprivacy data elements revealed that both property parcels and
address points in conjunction with ownership information have a high rate of
identity disclosure success. Geocodable streets were found to have a low rate of
identity disclosure success and their results were comparable to a non-county
maintained street layer that was used for control purposes. Although the street
layers had a low rate of identity disclosure success, they could be used to identify
a narrow range of address possibilities and still pose a geoprivacy threat. Fortytwo counties in which approximately 13 million people reside make parcel data
with ownership information available for free or purchase. Given the high
success rate of the parcel data to disclose individual identity, this research
suggests that the majority of the state’s residents are vulnerable to potential
geoprivacy violations.
v

1. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
1.1 Background
Advancements in the field of information technology have greatly
enhanced the ability to acquire, analyze, and distribute information of varied
content. Although there are many benefits associated with such progress, it is
important to also consider the risks, such as the potential for privacy infringement
as there are “enhanced possibilities presented by information technology for
collecting data about individuals without their consent” (Olvingson 2003; p. 183).
The rapid pace of technological evolution can make it difficult to comprehend and
effectively manage its collective impact prior to implementation, thus complicating
privacy issues. This makes the development of effective information technology
privacy protection efforts and risk management strategies challenging, and in
many cases, reactive.
One of the benefactors from developments in information technology is
the field of Geography, specifically a branch called Geographic Information
Systems (GIS). GIS is described as “a computer-assisted process designed to
acquire, store, analyze, and display spatial data and their attributes” (Dent 1999,
p. 111). A small sample of the many applications of GIS includes environmental
modeling, epidemiology, urban planning, and emergency response. Any subject
that has a spatial component can somehow be served, or at least conveyed, in a
1

GIS.
Riding the wave of information technology, the rapid advancement of GIS
and locational capabilities such as Global Positioning Systems (GPS) has
resulted in the creation of vast amounts of accurate, accessible spatial data and
analytical tools that did not exist until only a few years ago. Although these
advancements have helped society discover and analyze spatial phenomena,
their inherent power has also raised concern over an individual’s right to
locational privacy because some of the information available for use in a GIS can
be used to disclose an individual’s identity. This privacy subset is called
“geoprivacy” and “refers to individual rights to prevent disclosure of the location
of one's home, workplace, daily activities, or trips” (Kwan 2004, p. 15). Because
of its ability to “integrate and analyze a large amount of geospatial data,” GIS is
at the forefront of the geoprivacy debate. According to Kwan (2004; p. 15), “the
potential of GIS to be far more invasive of personal privacy than many other
information technologies has caused serious concern among GIS critics and the
public.” When the physical location of an event is tied to its descriptive
information, the potential for privacy breach is exponentially increased because
of its interaction with other spatially located phenomena (VanWey 2005; p.
15339). GIS data such as roads, addresses, and property parcel boundaries
with ownership information provide the means to link the location of events, often
conveyed through other, seemingly benign means, to an actual individual. Such
underlying data is commonly developed and maintained by government entities
(at taxpayer expense) and made available for free download via the internet.
2

Contributing to the advancement of the geoprivacy threat is a lack of
public awareness regarding both sensitive data availability and how it can be
used within a GIS to disclose an individual’s identity. Therefore, the geoprivacy
debate is occurring within a relatively small arena by only those who fully
understand the gravity of the issue. If made known, however, the full scope of
available information as well as what could be done with it by someone skilled in
the spatial sciences, the issue of geoprivacy would likely garner more attention
and concern from the general public.
Although it is difficult to comprehensively assess the sensitivity of any
piece of information, an example of that which would be deemed “private” is the
location and identity of an individual with a certain disease. Maps depicting
locations such as points are commonly produced for medical studies aiming to
discover spatial relationships among the afflicted. However, “it is not widely
known that such maps can be "hacked" to allow individual-level information to be
recovered” (Armstrong 2005; p. 67). If there is sufficient detail and fidelity in the
map, the locations of the individuals can be extracted via GIS and spatially cross
referenced with other data, such as property boundaries with ownership
information obtained through a county website, to disclose identity.
It is certainly not the goal of the research community to compromise their
subject’s identity. The assurance of the preservation of confidentiality is not only
consistent with ethical research guidelines as defined by the American
Association of Geographers, American Psychological Association, American
Political Science Association, and American Sociological Association, but also
3

“necessary to guarantee the continued participation of the public in censuses and
social surveys” (VanWey 2005; p. 15337). If the public perceives that their
privacy is being breached, they will be less likely to participate in locational
studies, effectively minimizing the potential public benefits that the study could
provide. A lack of effective research can lead to a lack of researchers so, for
many reasons, it is in the research community’s best interest to maintain their
subject’s confidentiality and trust.
Further complicating the geoprivacy issue is that the transparent nature of
research (e.g., disclosing methods, sources, data) presents an additional source
of vulnerability. Research and the progression of knowledge requires outside
parties validating, recreating, and building upon prior methods, data, and
findings. However, such efforts can compromise confidentiality as disclosure risk
ultimately increases with access. Even if access to sensitive research material
was prevented, merely knowing which research entities were involved with its
production represents a potential geoprivacy leak, as institutional knowledge can
lend insight or provide an unprotected gateway to the private information (Van
Wey 2005).
Guidelines do exist for disclosure of non-spatial medical and financial
records, but universally accepted or effective rules have not been developed for
spatial records. Where there are rules for spatial data (HIPAA) there is
opportunity for disclosure as “the rule (HIPAA) creates an exception permitting
disclosure of personal health information to public health authorities for public
health purposes without such authorization” (Rushton 2006; p. S19). Disclosure
4

is essentially governed by an individual privacy versus public benefit debate.
However, with little public knowledge that these discussions are being held, the
debate is one sided and can too easily conclude with a decision to compromise
individual privacy for public benefit.
Limiting the jurisdictional power of research guidelines is that the
guidelines only have meaning to those who aim to be accountable to the
overseeing organizations. “According to the concept of confidentiality, it is only
possible to share data with others who are obliged to the same confidentiality
concept and need the information in their profession” (Olvingson 2003; p. 181).
It is likely that a great amount of geospatial analysis with sensitive data occurs
outside of these organizational guidelines and is thus unregulated. Media
outlets, for example, are currently not subjected to the same guidelines which
govern the presentation of locational information of health study publications
(Olvingson 2003), yet their work (e.g., newspapers, newscasts) could
conceivably reach a greater audience than an academic journal article and
present a greater geoprivacy threat.
In an effort to mitigate the disclosure threat, several mechanisms and
procedures have been developed. These are referred to as masking techniques
and they aim to provide adequate analytical capabilities while preserving
individual privacy. Given the subjectivities involved with determining what
constitutes an adequate analysis, however, this is not an easy task. What may
be a suitable masking technique for one purpose may not be for another,
because an “adequately masked” data set could be combined with additional
5

information or knowledge by a third party resulting in disclosure. With technology
making the distribution and acquisition of information easier and effortless, it is
difficult to predict the intended and unintended uses of a mapping product as
there are “many unforeseeable downstream users and uses” (Olvingson 2003; p.
183).
In summary, there is an abundance of accessible, unregulated spatial data
that can be used with powerful mapping and analysis software to disclose
individual identity. This threat exists and is virtually unknown to the general
public. Ultimately, the success of geoprivacy violation attempts is determined by
the availability and quality of the underlying geospatial data as well as the ability
to use such data in conjunction with GIS software. With the increasing
availability of high quality data and the advancement and pervasiveness of the
software used to engineer geoprivacy violations, the geoprivacy threat will
continue to grow if left unchecked.
1.2 Goals and Objectives
Although there is a growing body of literature on geoprivacy and its
various components, most of it is field-specific and carries a technical tone that
might be abstract, irrelevant, and inaccessible to someone unfamiliar with
modern spatial technologies and venues for accessing related material.
Moreover, the existing body of research is fragmented and difficult to be used “as
is” to raise awareness of the issue and serve as a springboard for widespread
discussion. In addition, previous research has largely been localized, focusing
on specific towns, census tracts, or individual counties. These delimiters, while
6

certainly valid for their respective purposes, do not fully explore the nature,
extent, and magnitude of the geoprivacy threat.
To address the need for a more comprehensive, systematic, and tangible
assessment of geoprivacy, the state of Florida and its counties serve as the
study area for this thesis project. Florida is an appropriate setting for a
geoprivacy study of this scope because of two reasons:
1) Florida, its counties, and estimated 18 million residents (US Census
Bureau 2006) provides a geographical context that is well-known, has
jurisdictional significance, and appeals to a large audience.
2) Florida’s Public Records Law states that government records, including
computer records and subsequently GIS data, are public information
(Florida Statues, Ch. 119, AGO 89-39). Although a public record
preparation fee can be assessed (Florida Statutes, Section
119.07(4)(d)), several counties make their GIS data available for free
download via the internet as "providing access to public records is a
duty of each agency" (Florida Statues, Section 119.01(1). Some of the
GIS data that is made available by Florida government entities is
suitable for use in a reverse geocoding / map hacking process.
These two factors provide an important basis for investigating the following
research questions:
1) In what manner does the availability of certain types of information
necessary to engineer geoprivacy violations influence its success?
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2) To what extent are Florida counties and its inhabitants at risk for
geoprivacy violations?
By investigating these questions, the thesis documents and analyzes the
geoprivacy threat in a systematic manner that is easily understood yet grounded
in sound research practices; ultimately lending itself for use in policy discussions
at all levels throughout the state of Florida.

8

2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter provides a detailed summary of several key aspects of
geoprivacy and associated methodologies. It is important to consider that the
range of geoprivacy research is rather broad and encompasses several
techniques, issues, and practices. While practices such as mobile phone
tracking and video monitoring are relevant, this thesis focuses primarily on the
risks associated with the display of point data. The scope of the geoprivacy
threat, however, is not limited to what is presented in this specific study and
accompanying methodology.
2.1 Geocoding
Locational studies typically aim to determine if there is an association
between an entity and its proximity to an event. The questions researchers try to
answer is: where do the subjects live, and is there anything acting upon them
that is related to the factor(s) being investigated? These questions can be
explored using the powerful mapping and spatial analysis capabilities of GIS
(Geographic Information Systems). One of the many functions available in GIS is
a process called Geocoding, which can best be described as “the practice of
assigning a geographic identifier to a computer record that lacks it, thereby tying
information to geographic space.” (Rushton 2006; p. S16) This process is
widely used in locational research (Brownstein 2006; p. 2) as the subjects’ need
9

to first be located, typically from address information obtained by the
researcher(s), before analysis with other spatial phenomena can begin.
The geocoding process is accomplished by using GIS software in
conjunction with reference data that serves as an underlying framework for the
assignment of a real world geographic identifier. Such reference data is
available from a variety of sources and exists as either a line, polygon, or point.
A further explanation of this reference data and how it is used in the geocoding
process to assign addresses is provided below:
Line (street network based) – a spatially referenced GIS “layer” which
depicts streets as individual line segments. Information such as the street
name, address range, etc. are assigned to each line segment in the street
layer’s attribute table. Addresses are identified by using geocoding
algorithms that attempt to locate the address(es) of interest on the
underlying street network. This is conceptually performed by searching for
the components of the desired address (Street Number, Street Name,
City, State, Zip) and then using the address range information inherent to
the line to locate the desired street number by means of linear
interpolation along that street segment.
Polygon (parcel based) – a spatially referenced GIS “layer” depicting the
boundaries of property parcels. These parcels correspond to ownership
boundaries and have the address(es) assigned in the layer attributes of
each parcel. This information, in turn, can be used by the mapping
software to locate or assign an address.
10

Point (address point based) – a spatially referenced GIS “layer” which
denotes an address as a discrete point location. This represents the
highest level of accuracy for address information. Addresses are encoded
into the layer attributes which is used by the mapping software to locate or
assign an address.
Once geocoded, the subjects can be viewed and analyzed in conjunction
with other spatial data. This is the power of GIS; locating, integrating, and
analyzing spatial data of varied themes. While of great benefit to a researcher
who is looking to determine if high rates of cancer are related to residential
proximity to toxic waste facility, the very same tools used to answer such
questions can be used in conjunction with data containing personal information to
disclose identity. Evaluations of geocoding methods and their effectiveness have
provided mixed results. An assessment of the capabilities of firms that offer
geocoding services (line / street network based) resulted in high variability
among their products, pointing to the quality of the reference information used as
well as the tolerances used for determining what constitutes a match (Whitsel
2006; p. 8). In addition, the geographic characteristics of the population being
geocoded plays a role in geocoding success. Cayo’s 2003 study, “Positional
error in automated geocoding of residential addresses,“ examined the effect of
population density on geocoding accuracy (line / street network based) and
observed that rural addresses were less accurately located than more urban
areas. Sources of geocoding error include inaccurate geometry, inaccurate
attributes, and inaccurate ranging and there is also an accuracy tradeoff due to
11

the matching tolerances applied during the geocoding process (Rushton 2006; p.
S17-S18).
Despite the limitations of geocoding, it is possible to locate addresses in
accurate manner. Prior studies such as Cayo (2003), Whitsel (2006), and
Rushton (2006) cite the significance of accurate base data and consistent
address formatting of the input and reference data as determinants of geocoding
success. Both Whitsel (2006) and Cayo (2003) proclaim the increased accuracy
of using polygon / parcel based geocoding which “is expected to grow over time
as high quality, parcel-level databases become more uniformly available across
larger study areas” (Whitsel 2006; p. 10).
2.2 Reverse Geocoding (also known asinverse
geocoding or map hacking)
The functionality of geocoding, which spatially locates addresses using
underlying reference information such as street lines, parcel polygons, and
address points is a critical component of many locational studies. In addition to
providing geocoding capabilities, GIS software can also be used to determine the
location of a feature that has been mapped (in hardcopy or other form outside of
a GIS environment) but does not have a real world location or assigned address.
This process is known as reverse geocoding or map hacking (Rushton 2006; p.
S19).
Curtis’ 2006 study, “Spatial confidentiality and GIS: re-engineering
mortality locations from published maps about Hurricane Katrina” portrays a
common reverse geocoding scenario whereby a published map is scanned,
12

georeferenced, and the features of interest digitized to determine real world
locations. Once real world locations, or coordinates, have been assigned, these
features can then be linked and analyzed in a variety of ways to and with other
data; both geographic and non-geographic.
In Curtis’ study, reverse geocoding was performed on a map that was
published in the Baton Rouge Advocate newspaper. This map displayed
Hurricane Katrina mortalities as point locations and used census tract boundaries
as a background reference theme to provide the reader with an idea of where the
mortalities occurred. This map was clipped from the newspaper, scanned, and
then georeferenced to an existing GIS layer of census tract boundaries. The
point locations were then digitized from the scanned and georeferenced map,
which gave the features that were once merely dots on a map in a newspaper
real world coordinates.
To determine the accuracy of the reverse geocoding process, the real
world coordinates of the digitized features were then compared with GPS
measurements of homes in which mortalities occurred. Given that the published
map and the georeferencing target were of a common theme, (census
boundaries), there was a high success rate of reverse geocoding them to their
true location. The goal of Curtis’ research was to evaluate the accuracies of the
reverse geocoding process, which proved to be high. Adding to the success of
reverse geocoding is the presence of additional themes on the map such as
political boundaries and roads. These greatly assist in the reverse geocoding
process as they provide a common link for georeferencing. “The general point is
13

that layers or themes potentially displayable on a map add to the security threat”
(VanWey 2005; p. 15540). These themes lend the location of the study to being
vulnerable to general geographic knowledge of the area as physical indicators
such as coastlines, rivers, streets, and topography could give away the location
(Armstrong 1999).
Of course, not every single map lends itself to successful reverse
geocoding: “contributing factors in the successful re-engineering of information
from a cartographic display is the published map's scale, the size (and quality) of
the published map, the projection used, and the accuracy (or error) in the initial
mapping of the points” (Curtis 2006; p. 2). These items, in conjunction with other
information displayed on the map as well as the availability of the information that
is used in the georeferencing process ultimately govern a map’s hacking
potential (VanWey 2005). However, if the maps used in reverse geocoding
“accurately depict locations, they can be used to recover individual-level
information such as an address” (Rushton 2006; p. S19). It is the map’s
accuracy that is paramount; factors such as resolution are not as significant
assuming the map also has moderate visual clarity. Brownstein’s 2006 study of
the effect of map resolution on reverse geocoding success determined that “the
home addresses of many of these patients could be discovered, despite the low
resolution of the disease maps” (Brownstein 2006; p. 2).
The significance of these findings is that it is possible to use GIS to tie
these reverse geocoded or hacked locations to other spatial data, such as
property ownership parcels. This type of information is commonly distributed free
14

of charge from county maintained websites. If this data contains ownership
information it can be spatially cross-referenced to the reverse geocoded features,
resulting in identity disclosure.
2.3 Masking
Given the vulnerabilities associated with mapping individual locations,
researchers have worked to develop methods to protect individual locational
privacy while at the same time allowing valid spatial analysis to be performed.
These methods are referred to as geographic masks or masking. “The goal of
these masks is to modify the geographic information sufficiently to prevent
disclosure of individual identities, while retaining enough spatial accuracy for
geographic trends, clusters, or other patterns to be detected” (Rushton 2006; p.
S20).
Armstrong provided a comprehensive summary of masking techniques in
his 1999 work, “Geographically Masking Health Data to Preserve Confidentiality.”
A description of these masks and how they affect data are described below.
Where applicable, a graphic is provided to assist with understanding the masking
concept:
Displacement using translation (Figure 1) – moves “each point from its
original location by a fixed increment.” (Armstrong 1999; p. 502) This
results in a uniform shift of the entire data set.

15

Figure 1. Displacement Using Translation

Scaling (Figure 2) – this mask “changes both the distance from the origin
of the co-ordinate system (thus executing a displacement) as well as the
distances between point locations.” (Armstrong 1999; p. 502) This results
in a uniform shift of the entire data set as well as a fixed increase or
decrease in the distance between each feature.
Figure 2. Scaling

Rotation (Figure 3)– simply rotates “each point by a fixed angle about a
pivot point.” (Armstrong 1999; p. 502) This results in a uniform “twist” of
the data at a specified rotation point.
Figure 3. Rotation

Concatenated Mask – using any combination of displacement, scaling,
and rotation masks in conjunction with one another. (Armstrong 1999; p.
16

503)
Random Perturbation (Figure 4) – displaces “each point by a randomly
determined amount, and in a randomly determined direction, specific to its
original location.” (Armstrong 1999; p. 504)
Figure 4. Random Perturbation

Point Aggregation – this technique “uses a single location to represent a
defined subset of the original locations.” (Armstrong 1999; p. 506) An
example would be to use one point to depict that several incidences of
cancer occurred within the greater vicinity of that point, but not at that
discrete location.
Areal Aggregation – protects against disclosure by “enumerating the total
that exists within a region.” (Armstrong 1999; p. 506) An example would
be to show the total amount of incidences of cancer that occurred within a
census block.

The previously discussed masking methods have dealt with altering the
physical location or amount of information that is shown. There are, however,
other ways of protecting spatial data confidentiality that are based on some form
of data access control, agreements among the parties involved, or alternate
forms of display. These include:
17

Enclaves and Cold Rooms – where data is made available for analysis
at a physical location. No data is permitted to leave the premises, and
access can be restricted to certain individuals. (VanWey 2005; p. 15338)
Virtual Enclaves - a computer network accessed environment where
“restricted access to data can take place, without requiring travel, access
fees, or delays before the results are available to the researcher”
(VanWey 2005; p. 15341). This is similar to the concept of an Enclave /
Cold Room but the data user can obtain remote access to the data and /
or results of the object in study.
Software Agents – this masking technique involves remote access by
using software to formulate data requests which are “sent to the original
data repository, so the analysis could be done inside the original data
repository and then a summary aggregate report sent back to the
researcher” (Kamel 2006; p. 165). In 1999, Armstrong discussed software
agents in that “users would not be required to have access to confidential
health records. Rather, they would submit a request to an intelligent
analysis agent that would assess the request, and if found appropriate,
would complete the analysis and return a result to the data user without
exposing any individual-level health data (Kamel 2006).
Virtual Institutions and Virtual Organizations – building on the concept
of virtual enclaves, these are very generally described as a combination of
data distribution and analysis services whose access is governed by
means of pre-defined agreements. These entities can function
18

independently or in conjunction with others (including software agents) to
judiciously serve data needs (Kamel 2006).
Privacy, Access, and Usage Agreements – specific agreements
outlining what can and cannot be done with the data.
Reduction of Basemap Detail and Contextual Information – reducing
the amount ancillary information displayed on a map (political boundaries,
roads, descriptions) so that the possibility for identification of the study
area is minimized.
Abstract Methods (spider plots, graphs) – displays spatial information in
a manner whereby geographical relationships are effectively
communicated but not explicitly presented in a conventional mapping
format.
Omission - not using or limiting the use of maps for publication purposes.

The implementation of any masking technique will ultimately result in
some type of information loss when compared to the original data. However, the
information which is lost at the hands of masking might not be necessary for the
objectives and subsequent accuracy needs of an analysis (Rushton 2006; p.
S20). Kwan’s 2004 study, “Protection of Geoprivacy and Accuracy of Spatial
Information: How Effective Are Geographical Masks?” evaluated how the degree
of random perturbation affected accuracy. A masking threshold value was
discovered at which the masked results differ substantially from the non-masked
data. Results below the threshold were deemed adequate for the analysis. This
19

suggests that it is possible to use masking and find balance between information
loss and accuracy needs.
Despite the possibility for masking success, which is certainly a subjective
decree, a universally accepted solution that could be implemented on a large
scale (a scale which matches the amount of sensitive data that is easily
accessible) has not been developed. An evaluation of the masking techniques
which alter the position of the original data (displacement, scaling, rotation, and
random perturbation) suggest that “random perturbation is superior from a
comprehensive information preservation standpoint” (Armstrong 1999; p. 512).
Virtual solutions (enclaves, agents) are theoretically strong yet mostly conceptual
in nature and implementation is complex. Real enclaves are believed to carry
the lowest risk of confidentiality breaches (VanWey 2005) yet this may not be
something that would be possible for all data producers to implement as the
startup costs and continued management is prohibitive.
Even with the application of a masking technique, a dataset is still
vulnerable to being “hacked” if the masking method employed is discovered, if
alternate masked versions of the same dataset are obtained, or if ancillary
information (that may have been produced or disclosed afterwards by a different
party) is used in conjunction with the masked data to reveal the original locations.
Unfortunately, “there are relatively few simple cases or simple solutions” when it
comes to managing the geoprivacy threat (VanWey 2005; p. 15338).
Despite the uncertainties involved with masking and effective
implementation on a large scale, if disclosure risk is to be minimized it is “vital
20

that some masking occurs of the original point data.” (Curtis 2006 p. 10) This
belief was echoed at a recent symposium hosted in part by the Association of
American Geographers as “there was also a general concern expressed about
preserving individual confidentiality within spatial displays. This concern is
justified as map making, and the ability to deliver maps to a mass audience
through the Internet becomes steadily easier [5-8]” (Curtis 2006; p. 2). Providing
further grounds for masking is that “administrative records and other information,
sometimes obtained as an adjunct of newly emerging location based services,
can be mapped and cross-referenced to reveal the identities and characteristics
of individuals from information that is often available on-line” (Armstrong 2005; p.
64).
Lending further support for the need to mask sensitive data are the
uncertainties associated with other information that is currently or will become
available:
“an experiment using 1990 U.S. Census summary data surprised the
public health community by showing that datasets previously thought to be
adequately de-identified, containing only 5-digit ZIP code, gender and date
of birth, could be linked with other publicly available data (e.g., voting
records) and used to uniquely identify 87 percent of the population of the
United States [15]” (Brownstein 2006; p. 4).
A seemingly sound masking technique can be foiled by something that is difficult
to prepare for: the unknown.
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3. METHODOLOGY
The geoprivacy threat is real and it requires substantial research attention.
Understanding the nature and magnitude of the threat, however, is difficult given
the fragmented and intangible nature of the existing body of geoprivacy research.
This study hopes to address this need by exploring the following research
questions:
1) In what manner does the availability of certain types of information
necessary to engineer geoprivacy violations influence its success?
2) To what extent are Florida counties and their inhabitants at risk for
geoprivacy violations?
These questions are explored by emulating how a “map hacker” could attempt to
disclose the identity of non-masked, accurately mapped individuals using public
domain data via a reverse geocoding operation. This process was performed
and evaluated based on the following steps:
1) For all counties in Florida, determine the availability and quality of the
geospatial data that can be used for identity disclosure to occur.
2) Perform a reverse geocoding procedure to evaluate the capability of
available county data to disclose identity.
3) Investigate the relationship between population density and reverse
geocoding success.
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4) Explore the statewide implications of these findings by determining
population exposure with respect to the availability and reverse
geocoding success of the geoprivacy data elements.
A more detailed description of this process and each individual step is described
in the remaining sections of this chapter.
3.1 Geoprivacy Data Availability
Since geocoding and reverse geocoding require appropriate data, the first
step was to perform a county-by-county inventory of the information that is
necessary and typically used in these operations. The data must have been
made available through a county conveyance so as to be considered public
domain. The availability of the following county maintained data, referred to as
“geoprivacy data elements”, was determined:
A. Geocodable Street Layer
B. Property Ownership Parcels
C. Address Points
Given that there were some counties which did not have any of these data
elements, a non-County source geocodable street layer (Census TIGER/Line file)
was used to establish a baseline to which the other elements were compared.
Another critical component of geocoding, reverse geocoding, and mapping
in general is the availability of current and accurate aerial photography. Although
many counties acquire this imagery on their own and make it available for
purchase or download, at the time of this study the US Department of Agriculture
released imagery for the entire state of Florida whose acquisition date (2007) and
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quality rivaled or exceeded what most counties typically offer. Since a set of high
quality aerials for every county in the state are now available for free download,
the need to evaluate variability across counties was eliminated.
In addition to the mere existence of the geoprivacy data elements, factors
such as accessibility, ease of use, completeness, and cost were assumed to
influence the ability of the layers to be used in a reverse geocoding operation.
These characteristics were used to develop a classification scheme that
represented the final availability code for each geoprivacy data element. The six
categories in this classification scheme are described in Table 1.
Table 1. Geoprivacy Data Availability Codes
Data
Availability
Code
Yes

Description
Layer is available and can be obtained anonymously and without charge
(includes parcels that must be joined to ownership table)

Purchase

Layer is available for purchase therefore payment information and in some
cases a usage agreement is required (includes parcels that must be joined
to table) and cannot be obtained anonymously.

Indirect

Layer is available but difficult to obtain, use, or contact information and / or
a usage agreement is required.

Ineffective

Layer is available but not able to be used for reverse geocoding and
identity disclosure purposes due to a lack of addresses and / or ownership
information.

No

Inconclusive

Layer confirmed unavailable (includes layers in process).

Layer availability unable to be determined.

Based on the classification scheme depicted in Table 1, the county geoprivacy
data elements made available for each county in the State of Florida was
compiled into: (a) a table that documents each county’s offering; and (b) a series
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of county-level maps depicting the spatial distribution of geoprivacy data element
availability.
3.2 Evaluating Geoprivacy Risk
In order to evaluate whether or not the aforementioned geoprivacy data
elements contribute to geoprivacy risk, one county (Bay County) which has
complete data availability (geocodable street layer, property ownership parcels,
and address points) was selected and each geoprivacy data element was
successively evaluated for its identity disclosure success. The subjects whose
identity was targeted for disclosure were identified by randomly selecting 100
address points which represent owner / occupiers of the property. The address
point layer is the most accurate geoprivacy data element and best represented
an individual’s discrete location.
With the test population identified, it was then mapped in a GIS
environment, specifically ESRI’s ArcGIS, to provide the source material on which
the reverse geocoding operation was performed. A county scale map was then
produced showing only the county boundary, major roads, and the residences of
the mapped individuals (un-masked, of course) displayed as point locations. The
map conformed to a page size of 8.5 inches by 11 inches (letter size) and was
printed on a conventional laser printer.
Consistent with routine “map hacking” practices, the “published” map was
then scanned at a resolution of 200 dots per inch (dpi) and geo-referenced in
ArcGIS using the available source data (county boundary and roads) as
registration points. To determine the location of the residences as depicted on
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the scanned and georeferenced map, the point locations were then determined
by first creating a vector polygon circle that conformed to the areal extent of the
circle representing the boundary of the point on the georeferenced map.
Maintaining a constant capture scale, the boundary of each mapped residence
(displayed as points) was determined in this manner, and resulted in one vector
polygon for each mapped residence. The discrete location of the mapped
individuals was then determined by calculating the centroid of the digitized vector
polygon circles. This location represents the “hacked” location of the mapped
individuals and was used as the common starting point for each identity
disclosure effort.
At this point the actual location of the individual’s residence as well as the
hacked location had been established. Given that no personal information such
as name or address has been introduced, the possibility for identity disclosure is
minimal assuming that the “map hacker” does not have any knowledge of the
study area nor its residents. To establish a control value, the distance between
the hacked and actual locations was determined.
The real-world address of the hacked points was then determined by
using each of the data elements (geocodable street layer, property ownership
parcels, and address points) and their corresponding reverse geocoding method
in ArcGIS. The assumption here is that a street address is needed for identity
disclosure. For example, a hacked location may place the point in the middle of
a pasture. This location is deemed to be of little value until a street address is
assigned. Since the real-world address is critical, the hacked point was then
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moved via geocoding to the point on the reference data that represents the
location of the address obtained through the reverse geocoding operation, and
the distance the hacked point moved was recorded. Finally, the distance from
the hacked, reverse geocoded, and geocoded position to the actual residence
was determined.
After determining the distance from each hacked, reverse geocoded, and
geocoded location to its actual location, summary statistics were calculated to
analyze the various geoprivacy data elements and their corresponding
effectiveness (measured in distance from actual location). For all data elements,
the number of alternate residences within the distance to the actual location was
determined as well as an indication of whether or not the reverse geocoded point
matched the actual address, actual street, or neither. It should be noted that
when ownership information is available, an address match reveals an
individual’s personal identity. A graphical depiction of this process, using the
County Maintained Geocodable Street Layer Geoprivacy Data Element, is
offered in Figure 5, Reverse Geocoding Workflow.
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Figure 5. Reverse Geocoding Workflow
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3.3 Population Characteristics and Reverse Geocoding Success
Previous studies have indicated that population density has a positive
influence on geocoding success when using line based, interpolation methods
(Cayo 2003). Highly populated areas, such as cities, typically have shorter
streets and a more uniform distribution of addresses. These two factors allow for
the line based geocoding process, which utilizes linear interpolation methods, to
more accurately predict address placement in urban areas than in rural areas
where streets are typically longer and address distribution less uniform. With
respect to reverse geocoding, however, higher population densities offer an
ambient level of masking as there are simply more possibilities (people) shielding
the targeted individual(s) due to closer residential proximity. It was thus
necessary to look at the opposing influences of population densities, as this
experiment involved both line based geocoding and reverse geocoding. This was
accomplished by comparing the population densities for each geoprivacy data
element’s reverse geocoded point as documented by its corresponding 2000 US
Census Block Group value with its reverse geocoding success as measured by
distance to actual location. The results for each geoprivacy data element were
displayed on a scatter plot and included R-squared values as an indication of
linear association.
After the determination of data availability, reverse geocoding success,
and influence of population density, these findings were examined with respect to
county population totals. This comparison was used to obtain an understanding
of potential exposure to geoprivacy in the state of Florida.
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4. RESULTS
4.1 Geoprivacy Data Availability
The initial effort to determine data availability in Florida consisted of an
internet search utilizing the Google engine (http://www.google.com). For each
county, three separate searches were performed using the following key words:
1) Desired County Property Appraiser
2) Desired County GIS Department
3) Desired County GIS Data
In addition to revealing the sought after data and contact information, these
search criteria quickly returned a web site that catalogs links to Florida county
GIS websites. The information provided by this website was used to supplement
the existing search criteria and help determine data availability. The websites
retrieved from the search were examined for the presence of the three
geoprivacy data elements: county maintained roads, property parcels, and
address points. Where data elements were found and freely available, they were
downloaded and examined for their ability to be used in a reverse geocoding
operation. This examination was not only for the existence of address and
ownership information, but also for any characteristic which impacted the
usability of the data. Traits such as difficult access, fragmented files, or the need
to perform additional processing steps such as joining ownership tables to the
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GIS layer, was documented. The online search revealed a substantial amount of
variability among all counties as to what information was available, how it was
offered, and how it was described.
For counties whose availability could not be determined from the online
search, the best contact information (email, phone number) offered by the
website was obtained. For example, if there was a specific GIS or mapping
contact listed, that information was determined to be the best contact and was
pursued. If there was no GIS or mapping contact, the general email address or
phone number was used. Keeping with the desire to remain anonymous, email
contacts took priority over phone numbers. Only one contact was obtained for
each county mapping entity, which typically was the property appraiser and
county GIS department.
To fill in the gaps for counties whose data availability could not be
determined from the initial web search as well as insure the findings of the online
search, an anonymous email was sent to all counties which offered an email
contact inquiring about the existence of the geoprivacy data elements. The
following is a transcript of the email that was sent:
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________________________________________________________________
Hello. Could you please inform me as to how I can obtain GIS information for
your county? I am specifically looking for the following layers:
- Streets with Address Ranges (geocodable)
- Property Parcels with Ownership Information
- Address Points
- Recent Aerial Photography*
Is there a site (web, ftp) from which I can directly access any of this information?
Any assistance you could provide would be greatly appreciated. Thanks.
________________________________________________________________
*Aerial photography was deemed irrelevant due to the release of the USDA
imagery, however the email request was sent prior to this conclusion.
For counties whose best or only contact was a phone number, an anonymous
phone call (*67) was made to determine data availability and consisted of the
same verbiage as the email message.
The data availability effort required 201 unique web searches, 68 emails,
and 35 phone calls. It should be noted that only one knowledgeable contact for
each county entity, which in most cases was the County Property Appraiser and
County GIS Department, was pursued. With 67 counties in the state and
typically two departments being responsible for the desired GIS information,
contacting every conceivable entity to achieve absolute certainty would be a
monumental task. For the purposes of this thesis, it was determined that if the
information could not be located by a thorough web search, email, or phone call
to a knowledgeable source then the information is presumed to be difficult to
obtain which provides some level of protection, intentional or not.
Unexpectedly, there were a few referrals to county Emergency Services /
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Management department(s) for street and addressing information. The referring
county staff did not give an indication of whether or not these departments would
actually provide this information, just that they were the caretakers and to contact
them for availability. Given that these departments focus on providing
emergency services to individuals in need and every moment of their time is
critical, these contacts were not pursued.
The outcome of the county data search revealed significant variability in
both the availability and accessibility of the county maintained geoprivacy data
elements (Table 2). A review of the detailed county availability (Table 3) portrays
Table 2. County Availability Summary
Data
Availability
Code

Streets

Parcels

Address
Points

Total

Layer is available and can be obtained anonymously and without charge
(includes parcels that must be joined to ownership table)

18

15

12

45

Purchase

Layer is available for purchase therefore payment information and in some
cases a usage agreement is required (includes parcels that must be joined
to table) and cannot be obtained anonymously.

6

27

2

35

Indirect

Layer is available but difficult to obtain, use, or contact information and / or
a usage agreement is required.

7

5

10

22

Ineffective

Layer is available but not able to be used for reverse geocoding and
identity disclosure purposes due to a lack of addresses and / or ownership
information.

10

2

0

12

Layer confirmed unavailable (includes layers in process).

1

0

9

10

Layer availability unable to be determined.

25

18

34

77

67

67

67

201

Yes

No

Inconclusive

Description

Total

this variability in greater depth. Only seven counties make all three layers
available for free, and only 12 have all three available for free or purchase.
However, 24 counties make at least one county maintained geoprivacy data
element available for free and 45 counties make at least one available for free or
purchase. Therefore, at least one county maintained geoprivacy data element
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can be obtained for the majority (67 percent) of the state.
Table 3. Detailed County Availability

County
Alachua
Baker
Bay
Bradford
Brevard
Broward
Calhoun
Charlotte
Citrus
Clay
Collier
Columbia
DeSoto
Dixie
Duval
Escambia
Flagler
Franklin
Gadsden
Gilchrist
Glades
Gulf
Hamilton
Hardee
Hendry
Hernando
Highlands
Hillsborough
Holmes
Indian River
Jackson
Jefferson
Lafayette
Lake

Roads
Ineffective
Inconclusive
Yes
Inconclusive
Ineffective
Yes
Ineffective
Yes
Ineffective
Purchase
Yes
Inconclusive
Indirect
Indirect
Inconclusive
Purchase
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Indirect
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Indirect
Indirect
Ineffective
Ineffective
Purchase
Inconclusive
Yes
Ineffective
Indirect
Indirect
Purchase
Inconclusive
Yes

Parcels
Indirect
Inconclusive
Yes
Inconclusive
Indirect
Purchase
Purchase
Yes
Indirect
Purchase
Purchase
Purchase
Purchase
Purchase
Inconclusive
Indirect
Purchase
Inconclusive
Purchase
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Purchase
Purchase
Purchase
Ineffective
Purchase
Inconclusive
Yes
Purchase
Indirect
Purchase
Purchase
Inconclusive
Yes

Detailed County Availability
Address
County
Points
Lee
Indirect
Leon
Inconclusive
Levy
Yes
Liberty
Inconclusive
Yes
Madison
No
Manatee
No
Marion
Yes
Martin
Inconclusive
Miami-Dade
Inconclusive
Monroe
Yes
Nassau
Okaloosa
Inconclusive
Okeechobee
Indirect
Orange
Indirect
Osceola
Inconclusive
Palm Beach
No
Pasco
Inconclusive
Pinellas
Inconclusive
Polk
Indirect
Inconclusive
Putnam
Inconclusive
Santa Rosa
No
Sarasota
Indirect
Seminole
No
St. Johns
Inconclusive
St. Lucie
Purchase
Sumter
Suwannee
Inconclusive
Taylor
Yes
Union
Inconclusive
Volusia
Indirect
Wakulla
Indirect
Walton
Indirect
Washington
Inconclusive
Yes

Roads
Yes
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Yes
Yes
Ineffective
Inconclusive
Yes
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Yes
Yes
Inconclusive
Ineffective
Yes
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Yes
Yes
Yes
Purchase
Purchase
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Yes
No
Yes
Ineffective

Parcels
Yes
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Purchase
Inconclusive
Yes
Purchase
Yes
Purchase
Yes
Purchase
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Purchase
Purchase
Inconclusive
Yes
Yes
Yes
Ineffective
Inconclusive
Purchase
Yes
Purchase
Purchase
Purchase
Inconclusive
Yes
Inconclusive
Yes
Inconclusive
Yes
Purchase

Address
Points
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
No
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Yes
Yes
Inconclusive
No
No
Indirect
Yes
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Yes
No
Inconclusive
Purchase
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Inconclusive
Yes
Inconclusive
Yes
Indirect

Despite performing an online search and attempting to reach the best
contact for each county entity, the availability of elements for several counties
was unable to be determined and were therefore deemed “Inconclusive.” The
availability of all three county geoprivacy data elements could not be determined
in 17 counties and there were 36 counties with at least one data element whose
availability could not be determined. Despite an inability to determine what, if
any, county maintained information is available for these areas, it is important to
remember that non-county maintained geocodable streets are available for the
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entire state. The following map series (Figures 6 – 8) provides a graphical
representation of statewide data availability.
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Figure 6. Statewide Availability of County Maintained, Geocodable Streets
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Figure 7. Statewide Availability of Parcel Data with Ownership Information
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Figure 8. Statewide Availability of Address Points
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4.2 Evaluating Geoprivacy Risk
With the statewide geoprivacy data element availability determined, the
next step was to select a pilot county for the reverse geocoding evaluation. After
the initial online search, only two counties had complete geoprivacy data element
availability: Bay County and Charlotte County. Bay County was selected as the
pilot county because it offered a more robust suite of data beyond the geoprivacy
data elements, included metadata, and had population characteristics that were
more similar to statewide averages. (USCB 2006 Estimates)
Following the county selection, the subjects of the map hacking effort
needed to be identified. The location of the subjects was conveyed by the county
address point layer which, in the case of Bay County, is the most accurate
geoprivacy data element. To best emulate a scenario which targets residents,
the county property ownership database was filtered to contain only those
individuals who were listed as owner / occupiers of the property. This reduced
the eligible population from 78,090 to 22,755. Of this subset, a simple random
sample of 100 individuals were selected as the test group. A limitation of a tool
used later in this experiment influenced the decision to use a sample size of 100
individuals.
A county scale (1:316,800) monochromatic map was then developed in
ArcGIS showing only the county boundary as a polygon, major roads as lines,
and subjects as point locations (Figure 9). This map was then printed with a
conventional black and white laser printer on standard copy paper. The 100
point locations, or “incidences,” were then counted to ensure that none were
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obscured by the other map elements and therefore able to be hacked.
Figure 9. Published Map: Bay County, FL Incidences
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The “Bay County, FL Incidences” map was then scanned at 200 dpi to a
Tagged Image Format (.tif) file, a lossless file format, and georeferenced in
ArcGIS using four road intersections as control points. The incident locations
were then “hacked” by digitizing polygon circles at a capture scale of 1:4800 and
then determining the polygon centroid using the ArcGIS “Feature to Point” tool.
The polygon centroid locations represented the starting points for all subsequent
reverse geocoding operations and are referred to as the “hacked” locations or
points.
The different types of reference data used in this experiment (point, line,
polygon) warranted the use of a different process to assign addresses (reverse
geocoding) to the hacked points. For the parcels (polygon layer) and address
points (point layer) an ArcGIS tool called “Spatial Join” was used. This process
assigns the attributes (the address information) of the closest feature in another
layer (the geoprivacy data element) to each feature in the target layer (hacked
locations) and calculates the distance between the two.
For assigning the address represented by the line features to the hacked
locations, however, an ArcGIS add-in called ET Geowizards developed by ET
Spatial Techniques was used. Several internal ArcGIS tools and code samples
were explored prior to making the decision to use this utility, but the ease of use,
low cost ($195), and effectiveness of ET Geowizards made it an appropriate
choice for this experiment. This software utilized all available address
components of the non-county and county maintained geocodable street layers
to assign an address to the target point layer. The hacked and reverse
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geocoded points were then geocoded using the address information that was
assigned from its corresponding reverse geocoding method. The distance from
these points to the actual point, or incident, and the number of alternates was
determined using a free ArcGIS add-in (Hawth’s Analysis Tools for ArcGIS).
The reverse geocoding analysis with the non-county maintained
geocodable streets produced eight points that were not geocodable and one
point which was an extreme observation at 42,419 feet with over 100 alternates
(a limitation of Hawth’s Analysis Tools). The county maintained geocodable
streets produced one point that was not geocodable and three with over 100
alternates. The parcels produced only one point that was not geocodable and no
points with over 100 alternates. All of the address points were geocodable and
had less than or equal to 100 alternates. The points that were not geocodable or
had over 100 alternates did not produce results which could be compared
quantitatively with the corresponding results for the other elements. To allow for
a quantitative comparison based on comparable sample size across all four
geoprivacy data elements, the most extreme ten percent (10 points) associated
with each element were excluded.
Table 4 represents the summary statistics for the reverse geocoding
effectiveness of the four layers and the initial hacked locations which serve as
control values, and thus documents the accuracy of the initial map hacking
process, prior to the reverse geocoding and geocoding steps. In addition to
standard descriptive statistics measures, the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE)
was used to evaluate reverse geocoding effectiveness. This computation
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measures the average magnitude of the error, giving a progressively higher
weight to larger error values. RMSE provides an indication of the consistency of
the process being measured and has been utilized in previous studies of spatial
proximity and accuracy (e.g., Zandbergen and Green 2007).
Table 4. Reverse Geocoding Results
Control
Summary Statistic
(excludes 10% extreme
observations)
Minimum (feet)
Maximum (feet)
Mean (feet)
Median (feet)
Standard Deviation (feet)
Root Mean Square Error
% Match Address*
% Match Street
Mean # Alternates

Hacked Locations
(no geocoding)
6.6
81.3
39.8
41.1
17.3
43.4
Not Applicable**
Not Applicable**
0.1

Geoprivacy Data Elements
Non-county
Maintained Roads
13.7
503.5
144.1
119.1
94.9
172.2
3.3%
66.7%
3.3

County Maintained
Roads
63.1
357.1
132.8
115.2
59.7
145.5
7.8%
86.7%
1.8

Property Parcels

Address Points

0.0
93.5
19.4
9.8
22.4
29.5
87.8%
98.9%
0.2

0.0
51.3
0.6
0.0
5.4
5.4
98.9%
100.0%
0.0

* When ownership information is present, an address match also reveals identity.
** The control value represents the initial map hacking effort, prior to address determination. Geocoding was not performed therefore these
measures do not apply.

Table 4 shows that initial map hacking, as depicted by the values for the
control “Hacked Locations”, was very accurate. The RMSE from hacked to
actual locations was 43.4 feet with the least accurate point being an extreme
observation at only 81.3 feet away from its actual location. Lending further
support to the claim of high map hacking accuracy is that the mean number of
alternates for the hacked locations was 0.1. These values are surprising in light
of the map’s small scale (1:316,800) and limited detail. Furthermore, the map
was reproduced twice (printing and scanning) prior to georeferencing and each
reproduction presents an opportunity for errors to be introduced. No geocoding
was performed for the hacked locations layer as it served as the starting point for
the reverse geocoding process and was a control value to which the other
elements were compared.
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The Address Points layer produced the most accurate results, with the
RMSE being 5.4 feet. This value is nine times greater than the mean of 0.6 feet
and this disparity, although small in terms of real world distance, was influenced
by the maximum value of 51.3 feet. The address and street address match rates
were 98.9 percent and 100 percent, respectively, rendering the address point
layer extremely effective at identity disclosure.
While the results for Property Parcels were also very accurate, these did
not approach the accuracy of the address points, at least in a statistical sense.
RMSE was determined to be 29.5 feet and match rates were 87.8 percent for the
target’s address and 98.9 percent for target’s street. The maximum distance to
actual was 93.5 feet, a relatively short distance for an extreme observation, but
the majority of the points were very accurate as the mean for all points was only
19.4 feet and the median 9.8 feet.
When examining the results for the Non-County and County Maintained
Roads layers, it is apparent that these geoprivacy data elements do not approach
the high accuracy values of the Address Points and Property Parcels. RMSE
values for the County Maintained Roads layer was 145.5 feet with an
accompanying address match rate of 7.8 percent and street match rate of 86.7
percent. Results for the Non-County Maintained Roads layer were less accurate
with a RMSE of 172.2 feet and address and street match rates of 3.3 percent and
66.7 percent, respectively.
Although many of the values for the road layers are several times greater
than that of the Address Points and Parcels, it is important to process these
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values in their real world context. For example, although the RMSE value for
Non-county Maintained Roads was nearly six times greater than that of the
property parcels, the resulting difference in distance is only 142.7 feet; which is
only a little less than half the length of a football field. The values for mean
number of alternates for the roads layers were nine times higher than that of the
parcels, but determining location to within an average of 3.3 alternates for Noncounty maintained roads and 1.8 for county maintained roads still puts them
reasonably close to the target.
The distribution of values representing reverse geocoding success
(distance to the actual location) are depicted by a box plot in Figure 10. The
extents of the vertically oriented lines represent the minimum and maximum
distance to actual values, the extents of the grey box represent the upper and
lower quartiles, and the horizontal black line which crosses the vertical line within
the grey box represents the median value. This was prepared to visually convey
and compare the aforementioned statistical parameters.
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Figure 10. Box Plot of Reverse Geocoding Success
Box Plot of Reverse Geocoding Success
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When examining the overall effectiveness of each element to disclose
address and identity information, the summary statistics reveal a distinction
between the road elements (non-county and county maintained) and the parcels
and address points. When looking at the statistics alone, an argument could also
be made that there is a similar disparity between the parcels and address points,
but when these numbers are considered with respect to their real world
significance the differences are marginal as they are both highly accurate.
Therefore, the parcels and address points were superior and similar in
their reverse geocoding capabilities and the roads layers were inferior, yet also
similar. A cumulative frequency distribution (Figure 11) of the data elements and
their reverse geocoding success illustrates the pairing between the data
elements. Whereas all points for the Address Point and Property Parcel layers
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are within 100 feet or less of the actual location, and most within 50 feet, both
road layers exhibit a much more gradual, yet similar trend.
Figure 11. Cumulative Frequency Distribution of Data Elements
and Reverse Geocoding Success
Cumulative Frequency of Data Elements and Reverse Geocoding Success
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Although the roads were less effective in disclosing the actual address
and do not have the capability to inherently reveal identity as do parcels, it should
be noted that the mean number of alternates for both road data elements is still a
remarkably small number: 3.3 for non-county maintained roads and 1.8 for
county maintained roads. Despite not being able to provide the certainty of the
parcels and address points, these elements did produce very few alternates and
should be thought of as an effective means of narrowing down address
possibilities to a particular street with few alternates.
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4.3 Population Characteristics and Reverse Geocoding Success
Located in northwest Florida (aka the Panhandle) on the Gulf of Mexico,
Bay County ranks 25th in the state with respect to population at 148,217 and is
30th in land area at 763.7 square miles. (USCB 2000) This puts the overall
population density of the county at 194 people per square mile. Nearly 25
percent of Bay County’s residents live within its largest municipality and most
densely populated area, Panama City.
To investigate whether population density influenced reverse geocoding
success within the county, a greater level of geographic detail was needed than
an overall county population density calculation. Therefore, the county’s 87
Census Block Group boundaries and associated population densities (Figure 12)
were used to better reflect variability across the county. Summary statistics for
Bay County’s Census Block Groups are depicted in Table 5.
Table 5. Population Density Bay County
Population Density - US Census Block
Groups (per 2000 Census)
People per Square
Summary Statistic
Mile
Minimum
9
Maximum
5,338
Mean
1,686
Median
1,525
Standard Deviation
1,192
Total Population of Bay County: 148,217

The population density value of the underlying the census block group was
then assigned to each of the point locations of the test population (incidents) that
were the target of this experiment. This value was then analyzed with respect to
the distance that each geoprivacy data element and associated reverse
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geocoding method produced. This correlation analysis is depicted on the
following scatterplots (Figures 13 - 16).
Figure 12. Bay County Population Density
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Figure 13. Scatter Plot: Non County Maintained Roads
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Figure 14. Scatter Plot: County Maintained Roads
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Figure 15. Scatter Plot: County Maintained Parcels

Distance from Reverse Geocoded to Actual Location

County Maintained Parcels

CM Parcels

500

Linear (CM Parcels)
R2 = 0.035

400

300

200

100

0
0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

Population Density - People per Square Mile

Figure 16. Scatter Plot: County Maintained Address Points
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The results of the correlation analysis do not reveal any significant linear
relationship between population density and reverse geocoding success for any
data element. This is a probable consequence of the success of the initial map
hacking effort, which placed points on average 39.8 feet from their actual location
with the least accurate point registering 81.3 feet. Even in high density areas
there can only be few, if any, alternates within these short distances. An
exception would be high-rise residential structures, but these are not prevalent in
Bay County.
Although low population density has been shown to negatively influence
linear based geocoding, linear based reverse geocoding is a different process as
it uses the street layer as a reference for determining the closest address to the
target feature. Linear based geocoding was used, but it was based on an
address derived from the source layer based on proximity, not an interpolation of
a known address along a line segment. The address assigned via reverse
geocoding may be incorrect, as is demonstrated by the low address match rates
of both street based geoprivacy data elements, but it is an address that can
reliably be used to locate the feature back to the closest address on the
reference layer. In summary, linear based reverse geocoding is not influenced
in the same manner by population density as linear based geocoding, and in the
case of Bay County population density does not influence line, point, or polygon
based reverse geocoding success.
Data availability, the effectiveness of each geoprivacy data element, and
the influence of population density has been determined; but what does this
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mean for the state of Florida? As stated before, Bay County has population
characteristics (total, density) similar to Florida county averages (Figures 17 &
18). This likeness along with the finding that population density does not play a
significant role in reverse geocoding success permits the results for Bay County
to be applied to all counties and suggests statewide vulnerability.
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Figure 17. County Population
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Figure 18. County Population Density
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With population size and density not significantly influencing reverse
geocoding success, it is apparent that data availability is the key component of
geoprivacy risk. Considering that address points and parcels can provide for
successful identity disclosure, the state’s population (United States Census
Bureau, 2004 Estimate) was totaled for each geoprivacy data element and
corresponding availability code (Table 6). This was developed to provide some
insight as to the amount of people who, due to the data that their county of
Table 6. Population Facing Geoprivacy Risk

Yes
Purchase
Indirect
Ineffective
No
Inconclusive
Total

Population Facing Geoprivacy Risk
Streets
Parcels
Address Points
8,514,917
5,513,128
4,716,269
912,839
7,519,229
211,446
299,712
1,310,939
1,077,635
1,526,169
110,816
0
26,235
0
3,676,652
6,183,176
3,008,936
7,781,046
17,463,048
17,463,048
17,463,048

Population based on USCB 2004 Estimates

residence provides, are potentially exposed to geoprivacy threats. As Table 6
indicates, approximately two thirds of Florida’s residents live in counties that
make parcel data available, and nearly half of those counties make it available
for free. Given the high success rate of parcels to disclose both address and
identity, this is reason for concern as it indicates that majority of the state is
exposed to a potential geoprivacy risk.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis explored a very imminent, yet relatively unknown issue
affecting every citizen in the state of Florida, and perhaps elsewhere; geoprivacy.
Two very important questions were explored, the first of which being the manner
in which certain types of information necessary to engineer geoprivacy violations
influence success. The results indicate that if no masking of sensitive data
occurs and reference material displayed on a map can be discovered or
accurately replicated, reverse geocoding can be very accurate; even when
working from small scale material that has been reproduced. All geoprivacy data
elements evaluated could be used to assign an address to a point which lacks
one and can subsequently serve as a reference layer to locate that address
accurately relative to itself. The existence of parcel data or address points allow
for a high risk of identity disclosure, assuming that address and ownership
information is inherent to the data. Non-county and county maintained roads
exhibit a moderate to high success rate of identifying the target’s street and
produced few alternates. Although less successful than parcels and address
points, both street layers pose a threat for address disclosure; albeit a less
certain one. The existence of county maintained roads does not greatly increase
the chance for address disclosure when compared to non-county maintained
roads and neither road layers suggest a risk of personal identity disclosure as
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ownership information is not inherent.
The second question addressed by this research was regarding the extent
to which Florida counties and their inhabitants at risk for geoprivacy violations.
Although the entire state is subject to the Public Records Law, there is
substantial variability in the amount, quality, accessibility, and delivery methods
of county maintained spatial data. Despite these inconsistencies, this study
suggests that current data availability and associated reverse geocoding success
makes the majority of the state’s residents vulnerable to geoprivacy violations.
The widespread accessibility of parcel data, its associated reverse geocoding
success, and its lack of statistical association with population density support this
claim.
With these findings, this thesis makes a unique contribution to the existing
body of geoprivacy research by creating a comprehensive forum that exposes
the geoprivacy threat to a greater audience while retaining its academic
significance. It is anticipated that parties from various social, economic, and
professional backgrounds will use this research to engage in geoprivacy policy
discussions. State and local government should consider the privacy risks that
spatial information can create for its citizens and a debate which involves all
parties should be initiated to address geoprivacy concerns. Successful
collaboration will result in a more effectively managed threat; allowing geospatial
research and services to provide continued public benefit while simultaneously
protecting the privacy of its subjects, which has been proven to be threatened by
current practices.
58

It is important to consider some of the limitations of this study and explore
related avenues for future research. An important limitation of this research was
that statewide data availability and quality could not be determined with absolute
certainty. Several geoprivacy data elements (77 of 201) were marked as
“Inconclusive” for several counties. A more exhaustive effort to determine data
availability could resolve these uncertainties. In addition to resolving the
“Inconclusives”, an examination of the geoprivacy data elements that were
available only for purchase would be needed to accurately determine their
suitability for use in a reverse geocoding operation. Although this was attempted
to be resolved through careful wording of the data requests (with ownership
information, geocodable, etc.), without first-hand knowledge the county
representative had to be relied upon to accurately convey the layer’s capabilities.
Another opportunity to add to this research effort would be to modify the testing
population and sampling techniques. One random sample of only 100 individuals
from one county was used. Additional experiments conducted with larger
samples and/or samples from other counties using their geoprivacy data
elements could extend the findings presented in this study. Within these
limitations, however, the methods used for this experiment are believed to be
appropriate and the conclusion regarding statewide vulnerability conceptually and
methodologically valid.
Future research endeavors should approach the geoprivacy threat in a
holistic manner and carefully explore policy alternatives for managing the
vulnerabilities associated with making private data publicly available. The
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geoprivacy data elements used for the purposes of this thesis exist because they
provide a service to the entities who commissioned their development. By
allowing public availability, this data also provides a benefit to many nongovernmental entities that use this information for purposes which are part of the
state’s intellectual and economic engines. Widespread data availability, fostered
by the state’s Public Records Law, has created a complex scenario where there
are concurrent positive and negative outcomes. While personal privacy is the
key concern addressed by this thesis, it is important to include these and other
external, yet important, factors when addressing policy alternatives. Such factors
can only be identified, however, if all parties contributing to, knowledgable of, and
influenced by geoprivacy concerns are involved. This will require extensive
engagement and collaboration between public officials, citizens, GIS
professionals, corporate representatives, and the academic community.
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